The financial fragility and the crisis of the Greek government sector by Argitis, Georgios & Nikolaidi, Maria
Greenwich Academic Literature Archive (GALA)
– the University of Greenwich open access repository
http://gala.gre.ac.uk
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Citation for published version:
Argitis, Georgios and Nikolaidi, Maria (2014) The financial fragility and the crisis of the Greek 
government sector. International Review of Applied Economics, 28 (3). pp. 274-292. ISSN 0269-2171 
(Print), 1465-3486 (Online) (doi:10.1080/02692171.2013.858667) 
Publisher’s version available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02692171.2013.858667
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Please note  that  where  the  full  text  version provided on GALA is  not  the  final  published 
version, the version made available will be the most up-to-date full-text (post-print) version as 
provided by the author(s).  Where possible, or if citing, it is recommended that the publisher’s  
(definitive) version be consulted to ensure any subsequent changes to the text are noted.
Citation for this version held on GALA:
Argitis, Georgios and Nikolaidi, Maria (2014) The financial fragility and the crisis of the Greek 





This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in 




The financial fragility and the crisis of the Greek government sector 
 
Georgios Argitisa, and Maria Nikolaidib 
 
a
 Department of Economics, University of Athens, 8 Pesmatzoglou str, 10559 Athens, 
Greece; b Labour Institute, Greek General Confederation of Labour, and Department 
of Economics, University of Athens, 71A Emmanouil Benaki str, 10681, Athens, 
Greece 
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop Minskyan financial fragility indices for the 
government sector and to examine the financial structure of the Greek government 
before and after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009. We provide empirical 
evidence that clearly shows the growing financial fragility of the Greek public sector 
in the 2000’s. We also assess the effectiveness of the implemented bailout adjustment 
programmes in Greece and claim that the conducted austerity measures and fiscal 
consolidation have not significantly improved the financial posture of the Greek 
government sector. We argue that the implementation of fiscal and wage austerity in 
an economy that lacks structural competitiveness produces prolonged recession and 
unemployment with adverse feedback effects on the financial fragility of the 
government.  
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The current sovereign debt crisis in Greece, as well as the banking and fiscal 
instability in other Eurozone countries, brings forward the analytical and practical 
importance of Hyman Minsky’s ‘financial macroeconomics’. Minsky’s (1982; [1986] 
2008) major concern was to point out that in monetary production economies 
instability is endogenous, because investment and capital development tend to rely on 
fragile financial structures. His ‘financial instability hypothesis’ examines the way in 
which economic units, primarily business firms and banks, create assets and liabilities 
and endogenously influence the cyclical and secular movements in the financial 
fragility of modern capitalist economies (see e.g. Fazzari and Papadimitriou 1992; 
Bellofiore and Ferri 2001; Papadimitriou and Wray 2010).  
 
In spite of the fact that Minsky’s theoretical framework basically examines the 
financial fragility of the private sector, his arguments can be extended to incorporate 
the financial fragility of the government sector (see Ferrari-Filho, Terra, and 
Conceição 2010). Minsky has argued in favour of the significance of his well-known 
hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance regimes for the government sector (see e.g. 
Minsky 1982, 32-33; 1992, 28). However, his argumentation has largely concentrated 
on sovereign countries in which the government sector appears to be a potential 
source of financial stability. He has not explicitly considered the case of non-
sovereign countries in which the government sector might be a potential source of 
financial instability. Lemmen and Goodhart (1999), Sawyer (2001), Bell (2003), 
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Wray (2003), Sardoni and Wray (2006) and Kelton and Wray (2009) have pointed out 
that the financial posture of the government sector of non-sovereign countries matters, 
because these countries cannot finance their expenditures and debt obligations by 
issuing their own currency. They have also argued that within the current institutional 
structure of the Eurozone the non-sovereign government spending depends on the 
perceived credit risk of government bonds in the financial markets. If this risk is 
conceived to be high, then the financing of government expenditures and debt 
commitments can be disrupted.1 
 
Moreover, the institutional framework of the European Central Bank (ECB) which 
does not authorise the latter to function as ‘lender of last resort’ to the government 
sector of the Eurozone countries is the major reason that their sovereign bonds in the 
global financial markets face default risk.2 Government bond markets can discipline 
the countries with high and rising budget deficits, as exemplified by credit 
downgrades that place upward pressures on the lending interest rates and the prices of 
the Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). As long as the ECB does not guarantee the non-
default of the euro states, the debt-financing of the government deficits is susceptible 
to financial perceptions, the judgments of credit rating agencies and the speculation of 
investors, especially when these deficits are higher than the percentage defined by the 
Maastricht Treaty.3 
 
Consequently, the financial posture of the national government sectors in the 
Eurozone has become of paramount importance for the analysis and evaluation of 
economies’ financial stability and possibility of default. As the recent sovereign debt 
crisis has indicated, a government sector with increasing financing needs is 
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susceptible to potential changes in financial perceptions. The latter may lead to its 
incapability to borrow, with devastating effects on the implementation of fiscal policy 
as well as on the financial and macroeconomic stability. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a Minskyan framework for the measurement 
of the government sector’s financial fragility and to apply this framework in the case 
of Greece. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we develop and propose 
various indices that enable us to measure the financial fragility of a government that 
has relinquished its monetary independence. In Section 3, we estimate the proposed 
indices for the Greek government sector prior and after the onset of the sovereign debt 
crisis. We also discuss the ineffectiveness of the implemented austerity policies over 
the period 2010-2012, showing that they have not significantly improved government 
sector’s financial structure. Section 4 summarises and concludes. 
 
2. Measuring the financial fragility of a non-sovereign government sector 
 
At the epicentre of Minsky’s analysis of financial fragility is his insight that 
‘borrowing and lending take place on the basis of margins of safety’ (Minsky 1982, 
74; see also Kregel 2008). The fundamental margin of safety is, according to Minsky, 
the excess of the expected cash inflows over the expected cash outflows. For a non-
sovereign government sector, this margin of safety is given by the excess of the 
expected inflows from taxation, social contributions, asset ownership, asset 
liquidation or other sources, over the sum of the expected primary expenditures and 
the debt commitments (interest and principal repayment). 
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The higher the expected cash inflows relative to the expected cash outflows the higher 
the margin of safety of the government sector. If the expected cash inflows fall short 
of the expected cash outflows, refinancing is necessary. The willingness of both the 
government and its lenders to engage into financial relationships that rely on 
refinancing is a function of financial markets’ institutional structure and country’s 
previous fiscal and growth performance. Furthermore, this willingness depends upon 
government’s and borrowers’ perception of the appropriate margin of safety and the 
conceived assuredness of future cash inflows. 
 
We have already remarked in the introductory section that in the Eurozone in which 
the ECB does not act as ‘lender of last resort’ to the governments, the government 
sector can be financially fragile and, hence, a potential source of financial and 
macroeconomic instability. Therefore, the assessment of the financial structure of the 
government sector is crucial for the evaluation of the economic system’s financial 
fragility. Drawing on Minsky’s analytical framework, we argue that two factors 
should be taken into consideration in the measurement of the financial fragility of a 
non-sovereign government sector. First, government’s income statement and balance 
sheet structure from which we can figure out the degree of government’s reliance on 
the well functioning of the financial markets for honouring its debt commitments. 
Second, the extent to which the roll-over of government’s debt relies upon financial 
markets’ attitudes that can easily change as a result of small expectation shocks. In 
this context, we propose five indices to measure the financial fragility of a non-
sovereign government: (1) the liquidity index, (2) the debt maturity index, (3) the 
liquid assets to debt ratio, (4) the shares to debt ratio and (5) the non-resident debt 
index. We proceed to present these indices in turn.  
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(1) The liquidity index is based on Minsky’s well-known taxonomy of hedge, 
speculative and Ponzi finance regimes. Extending Minsky’s taxonomy, the 
government sector can be categorised into four regimes according to the relation 
between cash inflows, primary government expenditures and debt commitments.4 
Note that in the constructed index cash inflows refer only to the revenues from the 
main operations of the government. Thus, they do not include inflows from liquid 
financial assets or from the sale of less liquid financial assets (the role of these inflows 
is captured by the liquid assets to debt ratio and the shares to debt ratio; see below). 
 
The first finance regime is the hedge one, in which government is capable of covering 
all its debt commitments from its primary surplus. Algebraically, it holds that:  
 
AMORTINTTETR                                                                                            (1) 
 
where TR denotes the total government revenues, TE stands for the total primary 
government expenditures, AMORT symbolises the amortisation of debt and INT 
denotes the interest payments. The hedge finance regime reflects the case in which 
there is sufficient liquidity to ensure the repayment of the debt obligations without 
new borrowing.  
 
The second case is that of a speculative government, which can repay its interest 
without resorting to new borrowing. However, its primary surplus is not enough to 




AMORTINTTETRINT                                                                                 (2) 
 
Government’s finance regime is Ponzi when the primary surplus is not enough to 
cover its interest payments. The relationship between the cash flows of a Ponzi 
finance regime is expressed as: 
 
INTTETR 0                                                                                                       (3) 
 
Finally, when the government sector exhibits an ultra-Ponzi finance regime, it runs a 
primary deficit. This implies that a part of government’s primary expenditures cannot 
be covered without new borrowing. The margins of safety are, therefore, at their 
lowest level. Algebraically, it holds that: 
 
0TETR                                                                                                                  (4) 
 
Several important points are in order. First, each of the above-mentioned finance 
regimes generates certain dynamics in the government’s debt and financial 
commitments. In particular, if the government’s finance regime is characterised as 
Ponzi or ultra-Ponzi, the net debt increases (assuming no changes in asset prices and 
exchange rates).5 Since a higher net debt implies more debt commitments and less 
financial assets in the future, the more a government remains in the Ponzi or ultra-
Ponzi regime, the more difficult it is to improve its liquidity position. This may give 
rise to problems of debt sustainability, insolvency and loss of credibility. On the 
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contrary, if the government is hedge or speculative its net debt declines. Thus, the 
risks of illiquidity and insolvency are lower.  
 
However, it should be remarked that the link between the finance regimes and the 
gross debt to GDP dynamics is not straightforward. The government sector may be for 
many years in the ultra-Ponzi regime without seeing an explosion in its debt to GDP 
ratio. This is more likely to be the case when government expenditures have a 
significant growth-enhancing effect and the real (after-tax) lending interest rate is low 
relative to the real growth rate of the economy. On the other hand, the government 
sector may run a primary surplus that proves insufficient to prevent a rise in its debt to 
GDP ratio due to the existence of a much higher real (after-tax) lending interest rate 
than the real growth rate of the economy.  
 
Second, the ability of a government to attain and sustain a sufficiently large budget 
surplus depends on various macroeconomic factors, which may not be directly 
controlled by itself. According to the ‘financial balances approach’ (Wray 2006, 2012; 
Godley et al. 2007; Kregel 2011; Sawyer 2011; Semieniuk, van Treeck, and Truger 
2011; Zezza 2012), the financial position of the government is by definition a function 
of the balances of the private and the foreign sector of the economy.6 The fiscal 
balance can improve only if there is a deterioration in the balance of the private sector 
and/or in the balance of the foreign sector. Thus, a rise in private sector expenditures 
and/or a rise in exports can improve, everything else given, the fiscal balance without 
any change in the behaviour of fiscal authorities. On the contrary, cuts in government 
expenditures may not be effective in reducing a fiscal deficit to a target level if the 
expenditures of the private and the foreign sector do not increase enough to counter 
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the contractionary effects of these cuts. In this case, the output is adversely affected 
and the automatic stabilisers may prevent the attainment of the intended balance. 
Similarly, a rise in tax rates may have, under certain circumstances, important 
detrimental effects on output and tax evasion, leading to lower rather than to higher 
tax revenues.7 
 
Furthermore, the sustainability of the private sector’s financial position is of 
paramount importance. Since government has a prominent role to play in stabilising 
the macroeconomy, a highly fragile private sector increases the possibility of 
unexpected government interventions (e.g. bank bailouts) which can substantially 
deteriorate the financial posture of the public sector. Moreover, if the tax revenues 
from various Ponzi activities of the private sector are significant, the financial position 
of the government sector can rapidly deteriorate as a result of financial or other 
shocks that dampen these activities. 
 
Third, Ponzi and ultra-Ponzi governments might need to take further initiatives to 
create the liquidity that restores their solvency and credibility. For instance, if there 
are credit constraints, then the sustainability of a Ponzi, and especially, of an ultra-
Ponzi government sector might require debt restructuring, complement to adequate 
macroeconomic and fiscal policies.8 Without debt restructuring, the restoration of a 
viable financial structure might not be possible. Besides, without debt restructuring 
money managers and bond holders are likely to speculate on country’s default, 
triggering higher interest rates. 
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Employing the classification among the four finance regimes, the following liquidity 
index (LI) is constructed and proposed: 
 
                     
AMORT
INTTETR 
,                    if   INTTETR   
 
LI             1 AMORTINTTE TR ,         if   INTTETR 0                           (5) 
 
                      2 AMORTINTTE TR ,        if   0TETR  
 
The financial fragility of the government increases as the liquidity index becomes 
lower. The government is: (i) hedge when the index is higher than 1; (ii) speculative 
when the index takes values between 0 and 1; (iii) Ponzi when the index lies between 
-1 and 0; and (iv) ultra-Ponzi when the index takes values between -2 and -1.9  
 
Our proposed liquidity index improves and extends the index suggested by Ferrari-
Filho, Terra, and Conceição (2010) along the following lines.10 First, in the index 
proposed by Ferrari-Filho, Terra, and Conceição (2010), when 0TETR , the 
financial fragility of the government turns out to increase as the sum of interest and 
amortisation )( AMORTINT   becomes smaller. This seems counterintuitive since an 
increase in debt commitments of the government decreases, ceteris paribus, its 
liquidity. On the contrary, when our index takes negative values, it becomes more 
negative as the debt commitments increase. Second, and more importantly, when the 
primary budget surplus does not cover the sum of interest and amortisation, the index 
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proposed by Ferrari-Filho, Terra, and Conceição (2010) does not distinguish between 
a regime in which the government can cover its interest payments and a regime in 
which the government needs new debt to repay its interest. In our index, when the 
primary budget surplus does not cover the debt commitments, there are two cases: 
first, the case in which the index takes values between 0 and 1 which implies that the 
government can cover its interest payments (speculative government), and, second, 
the case in which the index takes values between -1 and 0 which implies that the 
government cannot cover its interest payments (Ponzi government). 
 
It should be pointed out that the government’s liquidity index provides accurate 
information only about the past and the present situation of the government’s financial 
structure. The estimation of the future values of the liquidity index requires 
projections over the government’s primary balance and its debt commitments. Both 
variables are dynamic and depend on prior knowledge about many other monetary, 
fiscal and macroeconomic variables.  
 
(2) The debt maturity index is defined as the ratio of long-term (higher than 5 years) 
debt to total debt. This index provides a general picture of the time profile of the 
government’s principal repayment commitments. Minsky has pointed out the 
importance of debt maturity in the determination of the financial posture of an 
economic unit (see, e.g. Minsky [1986] 2008, 351-352). The higher the maturity the 
longer the horizon over which a specific debt must be repaid and, therefore, the lower 
the debt commitments in the short run. However, the relationship of the debt maturity 
index with the government’s financial fragility is not straightforward. If the deficit of 
a government is expected to be higher in the short run rather than in the long run, a 
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longer maturity is beneficial for the government’s financial position. When the 
opposite holds, a longer maturity might lead to higher financial pressure in the long 
run. Government’s financial fragility depends, therefore, on the decisions of the fiscal 
authorities about the ‘optimal’ combination of long-term and short-term debt. These 
decisions should rely not only on the expected fiscal balance but also on the expected 
conditions in the financial markets. However, irrespective of the expectations, it could 
be asserted that policy makers should keep a relatively small amount of the 
government debt in the form of short-term liabilities. This prevents continuous 
refinancing from the markets. At the same time, though, they should avoid deferring 
the majority of the debt repayments in the future.11   
 
(3) The liquid assets to debt ratio is defined as the proportion of government’s 
currency and deposits to its gross debt. In general, the higher the liquid assets held by 
economic units (relative to their debt) the easier it is to deal with unforeseen 
contingencies related to the fulfillment of their financial obligations (see, e.g. Minsky 
[1986] 2008, 90; Tymoigne 2009, 133). For the government, a high liquid assets to 
debt ratio implies that it can more easily use available cash in periods in which 
revenues and external finance availability might not be enough to cover expenditures 
and debt commitments. 
 
(4) The shares to debt ratio is given by the value of the shares and other equity of the 
government relative to its gross debt. This index shows the extent to which the sale of 
financial assets can be used through privatisation for the reduction of the government 
debt and the fulfillment of government’s financial commitments. Some issues should 
be pointed out. First, this index is sensitive to changes in the market price of 
 13 
government’s shares. Euphoric financial conditions are broadly conducive to higher 
market prices and thus to higher proceeds from privatisations. Contrariwise, in periods 
of financial distress the market prices of government’s shares are more likely to 
decline, reducing the proceeds from privatisations. Second, the positive cash inflows 
effects from privatisations in the short run do not necessarily compensate for the 
foregone revenues due to the sale of the related financial assets (e.g. dividends). 
Consequently, the long-run effect of privatisations on the government’s financial 
position cannot be specified a priori.12 
 
(5) The non-resident debt index is defined as the proportion of government debt held 
by non-residents. Arguably, non-residents are less willing to continue refinancing, 
especially when the level of the government debt is high (see e.g. Bank of Italy 2011, 
14; Broos and de Haan 2012). Thus, the higher the non-resident to total debt ratio the 
higher, ceteris paribus, the possibility of financial constraints in the case of adverse 
expectation shocks. It is also noteworthy that when the non-resident debt is high, a 
significant proportion of the interest payments paid on government’s outstanding debt 
accrues to foreigners, and thus does not contribute to the income of the domestic 
private sector. This has negative effects on the domestic aggregate demand (see Zezza 
2012). 
 
3. The financial fragility of the Greek government sector 
 
3.1 The pre-crisis period 
Figure 1 displays the liquidity index for the Greek government sector over the period 
1988-2012.13 We observe that before 2001 the Greek government was either in the 
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Ponzi or in the ultra-Ponzi regimes. More precisely, the Greek government was ultra-
Ponzi in the 1988-1993 time span and Ponzi over the period 1994-2000. This implies 
that in the pre-EMU period there was a significant accumulation of debt 
commitments. Arguably, Greece moved to a Ponzi posture because of its fiscal effort 
to satisfy the Maastricht’s criteria, which induced a rise in the total government 
revenues as a percent of GDP, as well as because of the high growth rates in the late 
1990’s, which permitted to the government to take advantage of the automatic 
stabilisers (see Appendix 2).  
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
After the adoption of the euro in 2001, the Greek government sector remained in the 
Ponzi finance regime only for two years, shifting to the ultra-Ponzi regime in 2003. 
As a result, the government debt in nominal terms increased substantially over the 
period 2003-2009 and so did the need for debt refinancing. The surge in debt did not 
initially lead to a much higher debt to GDP ratio since the growth rate of the economy 
remained till 2007 higher than the real interest rate (see Appendix 2).14 However, 
when the economy slipped into a recession in 2008, the real growth rate became lower 
than the real interest rate leading to a significant rise in the government debt to GDP 
ratio in 2009. This rise was enhanced by the substantial increase in the budget deficit 
in the period 2008-2009, which is explained inter alia  by the impact of automatic 
stabilisers, as a result of the recession.15 The increase in the budget deficit is also 
behind the fall in the liquidity index from -1.30 in 2007 to -1.45 in 2009. Remarkably, 
this fall is also linked with the higher principal repayments over this period (see 
Appendix 2). The rise in the debt to GDP ratio combined with the increasing 
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financing needs rendered the Greek government sector extremely vulnerable to the 
expectations of the sovereign bond holders and the speculation in the global financial 
markets.  
 
An important message from the evolution of the liquidity index after the adoption of 
the euro in 2001 is that the Greek government made no effort to increase tax revenues 
and curtail tax evasion during a period of high growth. Government revenues 
remained low relative to GDP (see Appendix 2). The easiness to roll-over debt via the 
financial markets motivated the Greek government to rely more on new borrowing. 
Significant was also the effect of Greece’s structural competitiveness problems on the 
deterioration of the liquidity index. These problems, which are reflected on its 
persistent trade deficit (see Appendix 2), restricted the contribution of debt-financed 
government expenditures to the growth of the domestic product with negative 
feedback effects on government revenues.  
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
Table 1 displays the values of the other four indexes that capture the financial fragility 
of the Greek government sector. We observe the following: First, the debt maturity 
index increased from 29.5% in 1999 to 56.1% in 2008. This development reflects the 
fact that in the years just before and after the entrance of Greece in the Eurozone 
government’s new borrowing took place to a great extent via long-term bonds. 
Therefore, the adverse effects of the accumulation of debt and financial commitments 
were not very apparent in the short run, preventing the liquidity index to further 
deteriorate over the first years after the entrance in the EMU. This, however, came 
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with a cost: the effects of the rising proportion of long-term debt started to materialise 
basically after 2007, when a significant part of this long-term debt needed to be 
refinanced. This rise in the principal repayment put substantial pressure on the 
financial position of the Greek government, since it coincided with the outbreak of the 
global financial crisis, which generated financial turbulence and conservative 
perceptions of risk by investors. In addition, the Greek economy shifted to a 
recessionary process in 2008, triggering negative effects on the liquidity index. As a 
result, it can be ex post argued that the financial fragility of the Greek government 
was negatively affected by the decision made to increase long-term debt. This caused 
a transfer of amortisation payments from the late 1990s and early 2000s, which was a 
period of high growth, euphoria and financial confidence, to the period after the mid 
2000s, in which there was economic contraction and collapse of confidence in the 
global financial markets.    
 
Second, the liquid assets to debt ratio was very low, around to 4-5%, over the period 
1999-2009, which is amongst the lowest ratios in the Eurozone countries.16 This 
reveals that the Greek governments did not hold a sufficient amount of cash and 
deposits as a margin of safety against unforeseen contingencies that could potentially 
arise as a result of an unexpected fiscal or financial shock. Arguably, this might have 
been the result of the financial euphoria that Greece experienced after the country’s 
entry into the EMU which prevented governments from paying enough attention to 
the creation of a sufficient amount of liquidity. 
 
Third, the shares to debt ratio followed a downward trend over the period 1999-2009 
(although with various fluctuations). In 2009 this ratio was 13.3%, much lower than 
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the average in Eurozone-17 (18.1%). This suggests that when the debt crisis unfolded 
the Greek government had a relatively limited ability to use privatisations in order to 
cause a substantial reduction of its debt. 
 
Fourth, the non-resident debt index gradually increased from 40.8% to 79% over the 
period 1999-2009. As we have already marked out, the reliance of a non-sovereign 
government on the international financial markets may adversely influence its 
financial fragility. The fact that only one fifth of debt was held domestically in 2009 
reveals that the Greek government was highly dependent on the international financial 
markets. This was a significant reason for the Greek government sector’s inability to 
prevent its insolvency and incredibility and to keep access to liquidity when foreign 
private investors’ confidence about the sustainability of country’s debt collapsed in 
2009-2010. Besides, the accumulation of non-resident debt reduced the contribution 
of government’s interest payments to private sector’s income and thus to GDP 
growth. 
 
Lastly, following the discussion in section 2 about the role of private sector’s financial 
position in the prospects of government’s financial structure, it is worthy to point out 
that the private credit to GDP ratio in the Greek economy climbed during the 2000s 
from 55.4% in 2000 to 122.6% in 2009 (see Appendix 2). This implies that the Greek 
economy experienced a strong increase in private credit in the pre-crisis period. This 
credit boom was largely associated with the entrance of the country in the Eurozone 
which produced a decline in the lending interest rates and facilitated the borrowing of 
Greek banks from the international financial markets. The credit boom enhanced 
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unsustainable expenditures on consumption goods and housing. It also increased the 
likelihood of private sector bailouts by the government in the future.  
 
3.2 The after-crisis period 
The above analysis can lead us to argue that in the late 2000’s the Greek public sector 
was susceptible to a shift in confidence due to its fragile financial structure. This shift 
occurred at the end of 2009, when the country’s budget deficit climbed to 15.6% of 
GDP. The high deficit, in conjunction with the speculative attacks on the Greek 
government bonds, brought about a surge in the borrowing cost for the Greek 
government, which became incapable of raising funds from the financial markets. As 
the possibility of Greece to default on its debt noticeably increased, the ‘Troika’, that 
is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the ECB and the European Commission, 
moved in with an enormous bailout plan of 110 billion euros approved in May 2010, 
under the condition that Greece would apply an IMF-type structural adjustment 
programme.   
 
In particular, the first bailout programme proposed the liberalisation of labour and 
product markets, the sharp reduction of government expenditures (and especially of 
pensions and of public sector employees’ wages), the rise in tax rates and the 
privatisation of state enterprises. Besides, the ‘Troika’ claimed that wages in the 
private sector should be cut in order for Greece to restore its international 
competitiveness through an internal devaluation process. In addition, any discussion 
about restructuring Greece’s unmanageable public debt was totally ruled out by the 
‘Troika’ and the Greek government. 
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According to the ‘Troika’s’ claims, the neoliberal structural adjustment programme 
would help out Greece to place the government debt to GDP ratio on a sustainable 
path and to restore positive growth rates and confidence in order to return to the 
private capital markets in early 2012. None of these claims were verified. Instead, the 
economy experienced a deepening recession,17 the financial instability and the 
liquidity crisis were enhanced, and the government debt to GDP ratio increased much 
more than expected.   
 
In Figure 1 we can see the evolution of the LI during the period 2010-2011 in which 
Greece implemented the first adjustment programme. Three observations are in order. 
First, the index did not improve significantly over these two years. The Greek 
government remained in the ultra-Ponzi position with the index taking the values of -
1.38 and -1.40 in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Despite the fact that the primary deficit 
was reduced from 24.2 billion euros in 2009 to 10.9 billion euros in 2010 and to 4.9 
billion euros in 2011, the large amount of debt commitments prevented the index from 
moving closer to the Ponzi area. Second, the LI decreased in 2011 relative to 2010. 
Despite the additional cuts that were imposed in 2011 and the larger additional 
decrease in the primary deficit, the index did not improve because the amortisation 
payments were 38.3 billion euros in 2011 instead of 30.5 billion euros in 2010. Third, 
if we use the projections about public revenues and primary expenditures made by the 
European Commission (2010) at the beginning of the programme, the value of the 
index should be equal to -1.35 and -1.37 in 2010 and 2011, respectively; however, 
Figure 1 illustrates that the actual value of the index was -1.38 and -1.40 respectively. 
This divergence was primarily due to the fact that the government revenues fell short 
of the targeted ones. In particular, in 2010 the actual value of government revenues 
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was 90.2 billion euros instead of the projected value of 91.4 billion euros; and in 2011 
the actual value of government revenues was 88.4 billion euros instead of the 
projected value of 95.3 billion euros. 
 
Overall, the austerity measures incorporated in the first bailout plan did not have the 
desired effects on the liquidity of the Greek government. The underlying reason is 
twofold. First, the tax evasion was not significantly reduced because the Greek 
government failed to adequately reform the tax system in order to substantially restrict 
the tax evasion of self-employees and capital owners. Second, the recession in the 
economy and the unemployment rate were much higher than the projected ones. The 
recessionary effects of fiscal measures were extremely important not only because of 
their Keynesian impact on domestic demand but also because of the materialisation of 
‘anti-Ricardian effects’: the expectation for more austerity and, thus, for further 
reduction in incomes, adversely affected private consumption and investment 
expenditures (see Boyer, 2012). Moreover, the cuts in private sector wages produced a 
higher than anticipated reduction in private consumption and the lack of structural 
competitiveness in the Greek economy, due to its weak and limited productive 
capacity, constrained the rise of exports.18 The deeper than expected recession and the 
higher than expected unemployment had detrimental effects on revenues and on 
certain government expenditures (e.g. unemployment benefits). Besides, it is 
important to underline that anytime there was a difference between the actual and the 
targeted public revenues, the ‘Troika’ required additional measures, entrapping the 
economy into a vicious cycle. 
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In 2011 Greece’s government debt was completely unsustainable and unmanageable. 
This led the ‘Troika’ to revise its initial decision of no debt restructuring since it was 
realised that without a reduction of its debt commitments the Greek government could 
not restore solvency. On 26/27 October 2011 the ‘Troika’ agreed upon a Private 
Sector Involvement (PSI) programme designed to reduce the privately held sovereign 
debt of Greece by 53.5%. The programme materialised in March 2012. Furthermore, 
on 21 February 2012 a second adjustment programme for Greece was agreed. This 
programme was envisaged to cover the financing needs of the Greek government 
sector till the end of 2014. Importantly, the new financial support to Greece was 
conditional on the implementation of new fiscal austerity measures and the further 
liberalisation of the labour market. However, new financing gaps emerged during the 
next months, creating the need for further reduction in Greece’s debt and financial 
commitments. On 26/27 November 2012 the Euro area members agreed upon a new 
set of measures designed to relieve Greece’s burden of debt. These included, inter 
alia, a debt buyback programme, the reduction of Greek Loan Facility (GLF) interest 
margin, the deferral of European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) interest payments 
by 10 years and the extension of the maturities of the GLF and EFSF loans by 15 
years (see EFSF 2013). 
 
In Figure 1 we observe that the LI increased in 2012 relative to 2011. The PSI 
programme contributed to this improvement of the index. However, despite the 
decrease in debt commitments in 2012 and the additional cuts in primary 
expenditures, the index did not improve significantly. If we use the projections about 
government revenues and primary expenditures made by the European Commission 
(2010), the value of the liquidity index should be equal to -0.25 in 2012. In contrast, 
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Figure 1 illustrates that the actual value of the index was -1.34. This deviation 
between the expected and the actual value of the LI was basically the result of the 
lower actual total revenues, which were equal to 86.7 billion euros, relative to the 
targeted ones amounted to 97.7 billion euros.19 Again, the deeper than expected 
recession was behind the insufficient amount of government revenues.  
 
Some further developments need to be highlighted. First, the proportion of the Greek 
government debt held by non-residents increased from 73.3% in 2011 to 83.6% in 
2012 (see Table 1). This was due to the involvement of Greek banks and private 
bondholders in the PSI programme that reduced their share in the Greek government 
debt, as well as due to the increase in the proportion of the Greek government debt 
held by the official sector (i.e. the IMF and the stability mechanisms of the EU). The 
rise in the non-resident debt implies a higher reliance on foreigners for the refinancing 
of debt20 and a greater redistribution of income from the domestic economy to the 
external sector. Second, the debt maturity index increased significantly in 2012, 
reflecting the substitution of longer-term debt for shorter-term one, as a result of the 
PSI programme and the other measures taken to relieve Greece’s burden of debt. 
Although this rise in long-term debt is beneficial in the short run, it may have 
detrimental effects on the financial position of the Greek government in the long run. 
Third, the shares to debt ratio increased from 9.6% in 2011 to 21.6% in 2012, but this 
was largely due to the acquisition of shares by the Greek government in the context of 
its support to the financial sector (see Eurostat 2013). Fourth, the credit to GDP ratio 
of the private sector further increased in the after-crisis period (see Appendix 2) and 
the rate of non-performing loans achieved a record high in 2012, revealing an 
extremely fragile private sector. 
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Regarding the prospects of the government’s financial position in the future, it can be 
asserted that these crucially depend on the stance of the other sectors of the economy. 
According to the ‘financial balances approach’, the targeted decline in Greece’s 
budget deficit prerequisites the deterioration in the balance of the private and/or the 
foreign sector. There are, arguably, three alternative scenarios in the coming years if 
the current economic policy continues to be implemented without a new debt relief. 
The first scenario is that the private and the foreign sector will sufficiently decrease 
their balances basically by spending more. Under this scenario, the desired decline in 
the fiscal deficit can be achieved without leading to lower output. The second scenario 
is that these two sectors will not spend enough and the resulting decline in GDP (due 
to the fact that private expenditures and exports will not counter the negative impact 
of fiscal measures on output) will make lower the saving of the private sector and the 
imports of the economy, without any significant negative effect on the government 
revenues. In this case, the desired decline in the government budget deficit will 
approximately be attained (potentially with some additional austerity measures), but at 
the cost of a lower output, with unfavourable effects on the debt to GDP dynamics. 
The third scenario is the same with the second one with the only difference being that 
the fiscal consolidation and the deepening recession will generate, due to automatic 
stabilisers, lower than the expected revenues and higher than the expected 
expenditures, preventing the targeted fiscal deficit from being achieved.  
 
Our argument is that the private sector is not likely to spend enough and that a 
substantial increase in country’s exports will not occur due to Greece’s structural 
competitiveness problems (see also Papadimitrou, Nikiforos, and Zezza 2013). It is 
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also plausible that the resulting reduction in GDP will have important adverse effects 
on government revenues. Thus, we contend that the third scenario is the most 
probable one. Moreover, as long as the Greek debt continues to be considered 
unsustainable, the liquidity and solvency problems will be reinforced and will rapidly 
multiply and spread to the economy increasing financial instability. In this case, 
Greece will continue to evolve through a debt-deflation process with catastrophic 
employment, growth and wealth effects that will further reduce the government 




In this paper, Minskyan financial fragility indices for the government sector have been 
proposed and estimated for the Greek economy. Particular attention has been paid to 
the cash inflows and cash outflows relationships of the government sector, as well as 
to balance sheet considerations. It has been indicated that the general government of 
Greece has been in the ultra-Ponzi finance regime since 2003. Moreover, it has been 
shown that certain features of the government’s financial structure (the ratio of non-
resident to total debt, the liquid assets to debt ratio and the shares to debt ratio) either 
deteriorated or did not improve in the pre-crisis period, contributing to the financial 
fragility of the Greek government sector.  
 
The paper has also pinpointed that, contrary to the expectations of the ‘Troika’, the 
austerity measures incorporated in the first and the second adjustment programmes for 
Greece did not improve significantly the financial fragility of the Greek government 
sector in the after-crisis period. The implemented policy has caused a prolonged 
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recession, which has systematically exerted a negative feedback impact on the 
government revenues undermining the government sector’s capacity to attain a 
primary fiscal surplus. As a result, the Greek government sector has not so far shifted 
from the ultra-Ponzi to the Ponzi regime. In addition, the government debt to GDP 
ratio has not been placed on a sustainable path and no important improvement has 
been reported in other features of the Greek government’s financial structure. Overall, 
our analysis disputes the effectiveness of the conducted neoliberal programmes in 
Greece in terms of creating the conditions for the government to meet its debt 
commitments, as well as in terms of restoring government sector’s solvency, 




1. The financial posture of the government sector can also be important in the case of sovereign 
countries, in so far as the fiscal balance affects the external balance. In particular, under fixed 
exchange rate regimes, fiscal deficits are likely to cause an undesirable reduction in international 
reserves (see Wray 2006). Under flexible exchange rate regimes, fiscal deficits can lead to domestic 
exchange rate depreciation, with potential detrimental effects on inflation and the ability of a 
country to meet its financial commitments denominated in foreign currency. Furthermore, in both 
regimes fiscal deficits may have adverse effects on the interest rates. However, in non-sovereign 
countries the risks stemming from a financially fragile government sector are, arguably, more 
significant and straightforward. 
2. Of course, even if the ECB was authorised to operate as ‘lender of last resort’, this would not 
eliminate all risks of partial default for bond holders. In particular, both the exchange rate risk and 
the inflation risk would still exist. However, the main source of default risk would not be present. 
3. On 6 September 2012, the ECB announced its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme. 
Through this programme the ECB committed to set a floor to the price of government bonds by 
making unlimited purchases in the secondary sovereign market. The OMT framework has 
substantially promoted ECB’s role as ‘lender of last resort’ to national governments. However, it 
has not arguably rendered the ECB a full ‘lender of last resort’ to the public sector basically for two 
main reasons. First, the ECB continues to be prohibited to intervene in the primary bonds market. 
Second, a necessary condition for a country to qualify for bond purchases by the ECB is to have 
beforehand committed to some kind of austerity programme. The latter implies that the ECB 
supports the fiscal policies of Eurozone national governments only when it approves them. 
4. Although Minsky’s original classification relies on three finance regimes, in the case of government 
it seems appropriate to extend Minsky’s taxonomy by introducing a fourth finance regime (the 
ultra-Ponzi one), which reflects the case of a government running a primary deficit. Note that 
Arestis and Glickman (2002) have used a four financial postures taxonomy in their analysis of an 
open economy’s financial fragility.  
5. The net debt is defined here as the difference between the market value of financial liabilities and the 
market value of financial assets. The gross debt does not necessarily rise in the case of Ponzi or 
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ultra-Ponzi finance, as the government may, for instance, sell some financial assets in order to 
reduce its gross debt. Similarly, the gross debt does not necessarily decline in the case of hedge or 
speculative finance as the government may decide to purchase a significant amount of financial 
assets, offsetting the favourable effects of fiscal surplus on gross debt. For a detailed analysis of the 
relationship between gross debt, net debt and fiscal balance see Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama 
(2006) and Hartwig Lojsch, Rodriguez-Vives, and Slavik (2011).   
6. See also Minsky’s ([1986] 2008, ch. 2) analysis for the budget effects of the ‘Big Government’.  
7. See, for instance, the theoretical and the empirical literature on the Laffer curve (e.g. Fullerton 1982; 
Matthews 2003; Heijman and van Ophem 2005). 
8. See also Ferrari-Filho, Terra, and Conceição (2010).  
9. Note that the mathematical formula used in the cases of hedge and speculative finance is the same. 
Moreover, the mathematical formula is almost identical in the cases of the Ponzi and the ultra-Ponzi 
finance: the only difference is that in the case of the ultra-Ponzi regime, -1 has been added to 
penalise for the existence of a primary deficit. In this way it is ensured that the index for a 
government that runs a primary deficit always lies between -2 and -1. This enables a clear 
distinction between a Ponzi and an ultra-Ponzi regime.   
10. In Ferrari-Filho, Terra, and Conceição (2010) when the index is higher than one, the government 
sector is hedge: total revenues are larger than the sum of total primary expenditures, interest and 
amortisation. If the index lies between zero and one, the government sector is speculative: the 
primary budget surplus is unable to cover the sum of interest and amortisation. If the index is 
negative, the government sector is Ponzi: the public sector runs a primary budget deficit.  
11. For further discussion on this issue see Wolswijk and de Haan (2005) and Blommestein, Keskinler, 
and Flores (2011).  
12. An additional index that could be used for the evaluation of government’s financial fragility is the 
non-financial assets to debt ratio. In this paper such an index is not utilised because there are no 
available data for the non-financial assets of the Greek government sector (see Bova et al. 2013). 
Note, however, that the role of these assets is to some extent taken into account in our analysis: the 
proceeds from the sale of non-financial assets are reported in government primary expenditures as 
negative gross fixed capital formation (see Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama 2006, 3287) and thus 
affect our liquidity index. 
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13. At this point certain clarifications are necessary. Greece relinquished its monetary sovereignty in 
2001, when it became a member of the Eurozone. Thus, the value of the liquidity index is more 
important and meaningful for the period since 2001. However, we also present data for the pre-
EMU period for two reasons. First, this allows us to show the path dependency of the Greek 
government sector’s financial posture, since previous regimes affect current debt commitments. 
Second, as pointed out in footnote 1, the financial posture of the government sector can also be 
important in the case of sovereign countries. For the other financial fragility indices the analysis 
starts from the year 1999, i.e. the year that the European Monetary Union (EMU) was set up. 
14. In Appendix 2 the real pre-tax interest rate has been used instead of the real after-tax interest rate 
due to the absence of available data for the tax rate on interest payments. 
15. See Papadimitriou, Wray, and Nersisyan (2010). 
16. The only countries that report (on average) lower liquid assets to debt ratios than Greece over this 
period are France, Italy and Belgium. On the contrary, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Finland and Germany turn out to hold on average above 10% of their debt in the form of currency 
and deposits.  
17. In particular, the growth rate of GDP was -4.9%, -7.1% and -6.4% in 2010, 2011 and 2012, 
respectively. The unemployment rate increased from 9.5% in 2009 to 24.3% in 2012 (see Appendix 
2). 
18. The exports of Greece were also negatively influenced by the recession or weak economic growth 
in its trade partners.  
19. An additional reason is the capital transfer expenditures for banks’ resolution, amounted to 8.4 
billion euros in 2012. The recording of these transfers is provisional and subject to revision, since 
the fair value of the assets of banks under liquidation has not yet been provided (see Hellenic 
Statistical Authority 2013). However, even if these expenditures are not taken into account the 
value of the liquidity index is still lower than the expected one. 
20. Needless to say, since the main foreign lender of Greece is now the official and not the private 
sector, the reliance on non-residents for the refinancing of the Greek government debt is of different 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Government’s liquidity index (LI), Greece, 1988–2012 
Note: For the data sources and the definitions of the variables used to construct the 
index see Appendix 1. 
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Table 1. Financial fragility indices, government sector, Greece, 1999-2012. 
Year Debt maturity 
index
Liquid assets to 
debt ratio




1999 29.5 5.4 20.4 40.8
2000 34.2 4.2 14.7 42.1
2001 39.2 4.1 13.2 43.4
2002 22.6 3.9 11.4 45.9
2003 29.2 3.9 14.0 53.7
2004 33.1 4.9 14.7 60.0
2005 40.9 3.9 17.3 67.9
2006 47.4 3.9 15.5 69.8
2007 55.6 3.8 18.0 75.8
2008 56.1 5.0 11.1 78.4
2009 52.6 3.9 13.3 79.0
2010 48.6 5.1 11.4 75.2
2011 39.8 4.1 9.6 73.3
2012 71.7 6.8 21.6 83.6
 
Note: For the precise definitions of the indices and the data sources see Appendix 1. 
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Appendix 1. Definitions and data sources 
Variable/ Index Definition Data source
Total government revenues (TR ) AMECO database 
(code: URTG)




Interest payments (INT ) Interest paid by the general government2 (EDP). AMECO database 
(code: UYIGE)
Amortisation (AMORT ) Amortisation of the medium- and long-term debt of the 
central government and social security funds + short-
term debt of the central government at the end of the 
previous period.3
Hellenic Republic 
Ministry of Finance and 
Bank of Greece4
Gross domestic product (GDP ) Gross domestic product at current market prices. AMECO database 
(code: UVGD)
Debt maturity index The ratio of general government2 debt with residual 
maturity more than five years to total general 
government debt (EDP), in percent (%).5
ECB database, 
government debt6
Liquid assets to debt ratio The ratio of currency and deposits (asset side) to general 
government2 debt (EDP), in percent (%).7
Eurostat, economy and 
finance, European sector 
accounts
Shares to debt ratio The ratio of shares and other equity (asset side) to 
general government2 debt (EDP), in percent (%).8
Eurostat, economy and 
finance, European sector 
accounts
Non-resident debt index The ratio of non-resident debt to general government2 
debt (EDP), in percent (%).9
ECB database, 
government debt4
Real interest rate The real long-term interest rate (based on the GDP 




Real growth rate The growth rate of gross domestic product at constant 
(2005) market prices, in percent (%).
AMECO database 
(code: OVGD)
Sales of market output and output- for own final use + 
payments for other non-market output + other 
subsidies on production, receivable + taxes on 
production and imports, receivable + property 
income, receivable + current taxes on income and 
wealth, receivable + social contributions, receivable
+ other current transfers, receivable + capital 
transfers, receivable.1 The data refer to the general 
government.2
Intermediate consumption  + gross capital formation  
+ compensation of employees, payable
+ other taxes on production, payable + 
subsidies, payable + property income, payable + 
current taxes on income and wealth, payable + social 
benefits other than social transfers in kind, payable + 
social transfers in kind related to expenditure on 
products supplied to households via market 
producers, payable + other current transfers, payable + 
adjustment for the change in the net equity of 
households on pension funds reserves + capital 
transfers, payable + acquisitions of non-produced non-




(continued from the previous page) 




Unemployment rate Unemployed persons as a percentage (%) of the total 
active population (labour force).
AMECO database 
(code: ZUTN)
Credit to GDP ratio Ratio of non-financial private debt to gross domestic 
product at market prices, in percent (%).
ECB database, Euro 
area accounts, main 
indicators
Trade balance of goods and
services, in percent (%) of GDP
The difference between export of goods and services 





1/ For a description of these variables see AMECO (2005). 
2/ The general government in Greece comprises the central government, the social 
security funds and the local government. 
3/ There are no available data for the amortisation payments of the local government. 
4/ The figures for 2012 are taken from IMF (2013). 
5/ See ECB (2010) for the definition of residual maturity. 
6/ The figure for 2012 is taken from the Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance (2013) 
and refers to central government debt. 
7/ See Eurostat (2011) for the definition of currency and deposits. 
8/ See Eurostat (2011) for the definition of shares and other equity. 









































Trade balance of 
goods and 
services, in 
percent (%) of 
GDP
1988 29.2 33.0 6.6 20.5 -0.1 4.3 61.6 6.8 NA -5.1
1989 28.6 34.1 6.7 25.9 NA 3.8 64.8 6.7 NA -7.1
1990 31.0 36.2 9.0 26.9 NA 0.0 71.7 6.4 NA -8.8
1991 32.1 33.4 8.7 32.9 NA 3.1 74.0 7.1 NA -8.5
1992 33.5 34.2 10.4 35.0 8.1 0.7 79.1 7.9 NA -7.3
1993 34.8 35.5 11.4 31.4 7.7 -1.6 99.2 8.6 NA -7.3
1994 36.6 32.4 12.5 31.4 8.6 2.0 97.2 8.9 NA -5.6
1995 37.0 34.8 11.3 34.4 6.5 2.1 97.9 9.2 NA -6.6
1996 37.8 33.9 10.6 36.7 6.6 2.4 100.3 9.6 NA -7.2
1997 39.3 35.9 9.4 37.4 2.9 3.6 97.5 9.8 NA -6.6
1998 40.9 36.5 8.2 25.9 3.1 3.4 95.4 11.1 NA -7.5
1999 41.8 37.4 7.4 20.6 3.2 3.4 94.9 12.0 NA -7.7
2000 43.4 39.7 7.4 17.0 2.6 4.5 104.4 11.2 55.4 -13.6
2001 41.3 39.3 6.5 12.2 2.1 4.2 104.7 10.7 63.0 -13.3
2002 40.6 39.9 5.6 14.9 1.7 3.4 102.6 10.3 67.2 -13.7
2003 39.4 40.1 5.0 13.6 0.3 5.9 98.3 9.7 71.2 -12.4
2004 38.4 41.0 5.0 11.6 1.3 4.4 99.8 10.5 77.8 -10.1
2005 39.0 39.9 4.5 12.3 0.8 2.3 101.2 9.9 89.3 -9.3
2006 39.2 40.6 4.4 8.9 1.6 5.5 107.5 8.9 97.4 -11.4
2007 40.7 42.7 4.5 11.0 1.1 3.5 107.2 8.3 106.6 -14.1
2008 40.7 45.5 5.0 12.1 0.1 -0.2 112.9 7.7 118.4 -14.5
2009 38.3 48.8 5.2 15.5 2.8 -3.1 129.7 9.5 122.6 -11.5
2010 40.6 45.5 5.8 13.7 7.9 -4.9 148.3 12.6 127.6 -9.3
2011 42.4 44.8 7.1 18.4 14.5 -7.1 170.3 17.7 129.1 -8.1
2012 44.7 49.7 5.0 12.6 23.5 -6.4 156.9 24.3 129.2 -5.0
 
Note: For the data sources and the definitions of the variables see Appendix 1; NA: Not Available 
